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Abstract 
Strawson argues that we should understand moral responsibility in terms of our practices of 
holding responsible and taking responsibility. The former covers what is commonly referred to 
as ​backward-looking responsibility​, while the latter covers what is commonly referred to as 
forward-looking responsibility​. We consider new technologies and interventions that facilitate 
assignment of responsibility. Assigning responsibility is best understood as the second- or 
third-personal analogue of taking responsibility. It establishes forward-looking responsibility. 
But unlike taking responsibility, it establishes forward-looking responsibility in someone else. 
When such assignments are accepted, they function in such a way that those to whom 
responsibility has been assigned face the same obligations and are susceptible to the same 
reactive attitudes as someone who takes responsibility. One family of interventions interests us in 
particular: nudges. We contend that many instances of nudging tacitly assign responsibility to 
nudgees for actions, values, and relationships that they might not otherwise have taken 
responsibility for. To the extent that nudgees tacitly accept such assignments, they become 
responsible for upholding norms that would otherwise have fallen under the purview of other 
actors. While this may be empowering in some cases, it can also function in such a way that it 
burdens people with more responsibility that they can (reasonably be expected to) manage. 
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1. Introduction 
In his seminal essay, “Freedom and Resentment,” Peter Strawson (1962) argues that we should 
understand moral responsibility in terms of our practices of holding responsible. These practices 
are canalized by reactive attitudes such as anger and resentment, guilt, and vicarious indignation. 
Strawson was primarily concerned with what is nowadays referred to as ​backward-looking 
responsibility​, in which bad or problematic outcomes are traced back to an agent who is then 
held responsible and prima facie blameworthy (Watson 1987; Fischer & Ravizza 1998; van de 
Poel 2011). More recently, philosophers have added to the mix the notion of ​forward-looking 
responsibility​, in which an agent undertakes to ensure that certain outcomes (do not) obtain, 
certain values are upheld, or certain relationships are maintained (Goodin 1998; ​Darby and 
Branscombe 2014​).  
 
In this chapter, we consider new technologies and interventions that facilitate not just holding 
responsible and taking responsibility, but assignment of responsibility (and assignment of 
assignment of responsibility, and so on). Assigning responsibility is most easily understood as 
the second- or third-personal analogue of taking responsibility. It establishes forward-looking 
responsibility. But unlike taking responsibility, it establishes forward-looking responsibility in 
someone else. And when such assignments are either tacitly or explicitly accepted, they function 
in such a way that those to whom responsibility has been assigned face the same obligations and 
are susceptible to the same reactive attitudes as someone who, of their own free will, takes 
responsibility in the more familiar sense. 
 
One family of interventions interests us in particular: nudges and related moral technologies. As 
defined by Thaler & Sunstein, a nudge is, “​any aspect of the choice architecture that alters 
people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or significantly 
changing their economic incentive.” (2008, p. 6)​. Nudges are a subset of moral technologies, 
which attempt “to bridge the gap between moral psychology and normative theory by 
recommending ways in which we, as moral psychology describes us, can become more as we 
should be, as normative theory prescribes” (Alfano 2013, p. 6). We contend that many instances 
of nudging tacitly assign responsibility to nudgees for actions, values, and relationships for 
which they might not otherwise have taken responsibility. In so doing, such nudges do not 
bypass the agent’s reasoning or values; instead, they engage the agent’s reasoning and values by 
prompting them (if only unconsciously) to accept responsibility. To the extent that nudgees 
tacitly or explicitly accept such assignments, they thereby become responsible for upholding 
norms that would otherwise have fallen under the purview of other actors, such as the state or 
those with more political, economic, or epistemic power. While this may be empowering in some 
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cases, it can also end up burdening people with more responsibility that they can (reasonably be 
expected to) manage. 
 
Here is the plan for this paper. We begin by arguing that the Strawsonian framework is not 
sufficient for understanding the full range of responsibility-practices that need to be explained. 
Next, we enrich the Strawsonian framework with the concepts of assigning, accepting, and 
repudiating responsibility. Each of these moral psychological practices can take place either 
tacitly or explicitly. We then we explain how to incorporate nudging into the enriched 
framework. We argue that many instances of nudging are best understood as moral technologies 
aimed at assigning responsibility to agents who will be inclined to tacitly accept the assignment. 
We conclude by reflecting on the conditions under which assigning responsibility by nudging is 
morally acceptable. 
2. Strawson’s inadequacy 
The Strawsonian framework presupposes a largely horizontal power structure, in which each 
agent both is able to hold others to account and feels accountable to others (McKiernan 2016; 
Todd forthcoming). While such horizontal power structures undeniably characterize much of 
human activity both now and in our evolutionary niche (Dunbar 1992, 1993), they are clearly not 
the only ways in which people relate to one another morally and politically.  
 
Agents whom the naive Strawsonian might feel entitled to hold responsible via blame, sanctions, 
punishments, and reactive attitudes such as anger and resentment are often unaccountable not 
just legally but also -- to their own minds and from the point of view of their social circles -- 
morally. Someone who is excluded from a community via contempt or disgust may be taken to 
have no standing to hold those within the community responsible (Bell 2013, p. 6; Mason 2018; 
Darwall 2018). Kate Manne (2017, p. 186) discusses an example from ​The Talented Mr. Ripley 
in which a woman’s concerns are dismissed as irrelevant because, in her misogynistic culture, 
she lacks standing to voice them. Further examples from real life are not hard to come by, as the 
#metoo movement demonstrated in recent months. Conversely, agents whom the naive 
Strawsonian might view as beyond reproach are often blamed, punished, resented, and 
scapegoated for behavior that seems morally unobjectionable or even praiseworthy (e.g., 
whistleblowers like Chelsea Manning and Edward Snowden). 
 
Similar counterexamples crop up in the context of taking responsibility. Agents who might feel 
entitled to take responsibility for a particular outcome or value may sometimes be denied the 
authority to do so. For example, when Dr. Tamika Cross, who is black, raised her hand to 
volunteer to treat an ailing passenger on a flight from Detroit to Minneapolis on 9 October 2016, 
the flight attendant who had requested medical assistance demanded to see her credentials and 
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said, “Oh no, sweetie put your hand down; we are looking for actual physicians or nurses or 
some type of medical personnel. We don’t have time to talk to you” (Hauser 2016). Conversely, 
agents may be allowed to take responsibility for outcomes or values that they manifestly lack the 
competence to handle. For instance, in 2017 Jared Kushner sought and was accorded 
responsibility for managing the American opioid epidemic, resolving the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, and overhauling the entire US federal bureaucracy (Bartlett 2017). 
 
The Strawsonian might object to these alleged counterexamples by insisting that they represent 
abuses of our practices of taking responsibility and holding responsible. Presumably there is 
some slack built into these practices, allowing both for cases in which agents aren’t held 
responsible when they could or should be, and for cases in which agents are held responsible 
when they shouldn’t be. This is easier said than done, however. Strawson argues that our 
practices of holding responsible and taking responsibility, along with “their reception, the 
reactions to them, really are expressions of our moral attitudes [....] Our practices do not merely 
exploit our natures, they express them” (1963 [2003], p. 93). If this is right, then whatever 
practices humans systematically employ in the context of responsibility, punishment, and blame 
must be incorporated into the framework.  
 
Strawson and his fellow travelers attempt to systematize exceptions by articulating theories of 
excuses, exempting conditions, and the like (Austin 1979). But the sorts of counterexamples 
mentioned above do not fit into this framework and are, we contend, systematic enough to force 
us to rethink the Strawsonian framework. Scapegoating, victim-blaming, and retaliating against 
whistleblowers are as much a part of human practices as the horizontal reactive attitudes and 
activities that Strawson recounts. Manuel Vargas argues that they might be elements of the 
optimific (from his particular consequentialist standpoint) moral responsibility system. (2013, 
pp. 177-180). We are not just talking about corrigible problem-cases that present anomalous 
counterexamples to the Strawsonian framework. We are talking about cases where the 
framework systematically and constitutively delivers problematic results. If people are 
enculturated to respond to praise, blame, admiration, resentment, and the whole suite of reactive 
attitudes as Strawson suggests, then these outcomes are -- if not inevitable, then highly likely.  
 
These observations suggest that, while the naive Strawsonian framework may be adequate to a 
society inhabited only by saints and guilt-prone sinners, it must be supplemented for a world like 
ours in which the shameless ride on the buoyant unaccountability made possible by toadies, 
sycophants, scapegoaters, and the rest of their ugly menagerie. This chapter is an attempt to 
move beyond Strawson’s cheerful perspective by incorporating relations of power into the theory 
of responsibility. 
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3. Enriching the Strawsonian framework 
Define a responsibility-community as a set A = {​a​1, ​a​2, ​a​3, …, ​a​n} of agents (potentially 
including group agents), a set V = {​v​1, ​v​2, v3, …, ​v​n} of values (broadly construed to include 
desirable outcomes, relationships, and so on), and a relation R mapping from agents to values. 
Let ​a​R​v​ mean that agent ​a​ takes responsibility for value ​v​. Such a community is dynamic insofar 
as additional agents can be added to A, existing agents can be eliminated from A, additional 
values can be added to V, existing values can be eliminated from V, agents can assume new 
responsibilities, and agents can be stripped of or otherwise lose responsibilities. The familiar 
Strawsonian framework incorporates three main functions related to such dynamics. First, an 
agent can ​take responsibility​ for preserving, promoting, pursuing, or protecting a value. While 
Strawson himself does not mention this, it’s clear that in many cases the community possesses 
veto power over such taking responsibility. If your community rejects your bid to take 
responsibility for a value, whether because you lack standing to assume it in the first place or 
because you are deemed untrustworthy, you cannot take responsibility for it in a way that 
licenses others to direct reactive attitudes and the sanctions they express towards you. Second, an 
agent can be held responsible (via reactive attitudes, sanctions, and so on) for failing to preserve, 
promote, pursue, or protect some value for which they have or should have taken responsibility. 
Third, an agent can be (temporarily) excluded from the community by taking an “objective 
stance” rather than a “participant stance” towards them.  
 
These functions, when enacted explicitly, are part of what we might call the language game of 
responsibility (Wittgenstein 1953; Sellars 1954), in which the speech-act of declaring oneself 
responsible plays a pivotal role (Austin 1975; Searle 1995). However, they can also occur 
without any words being uttered. Gestures, eye-contact, shared assumptions, default rules, and a 
wide variety of other non-linguistic activities contribute to our responsibility practices. In this 
section, we supplement the Strawsonian picture by theorizing further functions available to 
members of responsibility-communities. These include assigning responsibility, accepting 
responsibility, and repudiating responsibility.  
3.1. Assigning responsibility 
Subject to the veto of the responsibility-community, when ​a​ bids to take responsibility for ​v​, she 
succeeds in doing so. In second-person and third-person assignments of responsibility, ​a​2 assigns 
a​1 responsibility for ​v​. As before, such assignments are typically subject to veto by the 
community. The assignment might be rejected because ​a​2 lacks the authority to make the 
assignment (either ​tout court​ or specifically to ​a​1), because some other agent is already 
responsible for ​v​ (and there is a limit on the number of agents who can be responsible for it), 
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because the community deems ​a​1 untrustworthy, because ​a​1 rejects the assignment, or for some 
other reason.  
 
These considerations point to the role of power in responsibility-communities. In extremely 
egalitarian communities, assignments are always only invitations, which the assignee can reject. 
At the opposite extreme, dictatorial communities vest the power to assign responsibility in one or 
a few individuals, whose declarations must be accepted -- both by the assignee and by the 
community at large. In between are a wide variety of communities in which some assignments 
are mandatory but others can be rejected (either by the assignee or by other members of the 
community). As before, assigning responsibility can be done explicitly through a declarative 
speech-act, but it can also be enacted through non-linguistic actions such as gestures, 
eye-contact, shared assumptions, default rules, and so on. There are also various means by which 
responsibility assignments can be vetoed by the community. The veto can be an explicit 
speech-act, but it may also be enacted through non-linguistic actions such as gestures (shaking 
one’s head, rolling one’s eyes), facial expressions (glowering), incorporating prohibitions into 
bureaucratic forms or online interfaces, and so on. 
3.2. Accepting and repudiating responsibility 
Because extant discussions of forward-looking responsibility are built around first-personal acts 
of taking responsibility, the distinction between assigning responsibility and accepting the 
assignment of responsibility may at first seem moot. Why would anyone take responsibility for a 
value in one breath just to reject that same responsibility in the next? While it is true that a 
community could veto the agent’s bid to take responsibility, the prospect does not loom large 
unless the assigner and the assignee are distinct. When we enlarge the universe of agents and 
allow for second-person and third-person assignments of responsibility, it becomes obvious that 
the assignee or other members of the community might resist a particular assignment. These 
observations make it clear that, at least in non-dictatorial communities, when ​a​1 makes a bid to 
assign ​a​2 responsibility for ​v​, both ​a​2 and other members of the community typically have the 
opportunity to say no. How easy and effective such naysaying is depends on whether the 
assignment was an invitation, a request, a plea, an offer of bribe, a threat of blackmail, an order, 
or some other speech-act.  
 
For our purposes, it’s important to bear in mind that the assignment may be non-verbal and 
tacitly accepted. In such cases, the assignee and the community may end up inadvertently 
ratifying the assignment of responsibility without even realizing it. This points to the need for 
agents and the communities they inhabit to audit the distribution of responsibilities and 
sometimes to repudiate some assignments. Such repudiation may be called for when someone 
who initially took responsibility for a value is no longer trusted to protect, promote, pursue, or 
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preserve it. It may be called for when the assigner no longer needs to trust another agent to 
uphold the value. It may also be called for when someone realizes that they have tacitly accepted 
the assignment of responsibility for a value that they should not own. If this is right, then at the 
moments of taking and assigning, and for an indefinite period thereafter, members of 
responsibility communities need to monitor and occasionally revise the distribution of 
responsibilities amongst themselves. They manage this via tacit or explicit acts of accepting and 
repudiating responsibility -- essential elements of our responsibility-practices that Strawson and 
his fellow travelers neglect. 
3.3 Higher-order responsibilities: powers and immunities 
In this section, we use Hohfeld’s (1913) structural analysis of first-order and higher-order legal 
relations as an analogy for first-order and higher-order responsibility relations. Hohfeld’s scheme 
is built on an ontology of agents and actions. There are four first-order legal relations that 
characterize agents and their actions: ​right​, ​no-right​, ​duty​, and ​privilege​. In this system, agent ​a​1 
has a right to perform action 𝝋 just in case all other agents ​a​2, ​a​3, … , ​a​n have a correlative duty 
to allow (i.e., not to prevent) ​a​1 doing 𝝋. By contrast, ​a​1 has no-right to 𝝋 just in case at least 
one other agent ​a​i does not have a duty to allow ​a​1 doing 𝝋; in other words, ​a​1 has no-right to 𝝋 
just in case at least one other agent ​a​i has the privilege to prevent ​a​1 from 𝝋ing. 
 
Higher-order legal relations concern not base-level actions but actions that do or would alter 
existing legal relations. As with first-order legal relations, there are four higher-order legal 
relations: ​power, disability, liability, and immunity​. In Hohfeld’s scheme, agent ​a​1 has the power 
to change R (where R is a first-order or higher-order relation) just in case there is some agent ​a​i 
who has a liability to changes in R. For instance, while you may currently have property rights 
over some object (i.e., all others have a duty not to use the object without your consent), a judge 
may have the power to strip you of that right (e.g., when applying a legal penalty). And while 
you may currently lack property rights over some object, a judge may grant you that right (e.g., 
when granting compensatory damages). Powers can also be over higher-order legal relations. For 
instance, in the United States a judge may be stripped of the second-order power to alter property 
rights through Congress’s exercise of the third-order power of conviction for impeachable high 
crimes and misdemeanors. 
 
Just as powers are interdefinable with correlative liabilities, disabilities are interdefinable with 
correlative immunities. Agent ​a​1 has immunity to changes in relation R just in case all other 
agents have the disability to change R (equivalently, no agent other than ​a​1 has the power to 
change R). An inalienable right is a right that is also protected by immunity (and immunity of 
that immunity, and immunity of that immunity of that immunity, and so on). For example, not 
only does everyone have a right not to be enslaved (everyone has a duty not to enslave them), but 
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that right is immune to all powers that might alter it (everyone has a disability to change that 
right). These relations are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. 
 
Table 1: first-order legal relations.​ This table illustrates the four Hohfeldian first-order legal 
relations. 
a ​has a right to 𝝋 ← contraries → a​ has no-right to 𝝋 
↑ 
correlates 
↓ 
 ↑ 
correlates 
↓ 
∀​b​∊A ​b​ has a duty to allow ​a​ to 
𝝋 
← contraries → ∃​b​∊A​ ​s.t. ​b ​has a privilege to prevent 
a ​from 𝝋ing 
 
Table 2: higher-order legal relations.​ This table illustrates the four Hohfeldian higher-order 
legal relations. 
a ​has a power over R ← contraries → ∀​b​∊A ​b​ has​ ​a disability to change 
a​’s possession of R 
↑ 
correlates 
↓ 
 ↑ 
correlates 
↓ 
∃​b​∊A​ ​s.t. ​b​’s possession of R is 
liable to changes by ​a 
← contraries → a ​has immunity with respect to R 
 
We can understand the possession of forward-looking and backward-looking responsibilities as 
analogous to first-order legal relations. Agent ​a ​has a forward-looking responsibility for ​v​ just in 
case other members of the community have a moral right to hold ​a​ responsible (subject to 
exempting and excusing conditions) for failing to protect, promote, pursue, or preserve ​v​. 
Likewise, we can understand taking responsibility, assigning responsibility, accepting 
responsibility, and repudiating responsibility as analogous to higher-order legal relations. 
Taking, assigning, or repudiating responsibility is the enactment or expression of a ​power​ over 
forward-looking responsibilities. Thus, in order for ​a​1 to take or repudiate responsibility for ​v​, ​a​1 
must have a ​liability​ with respect to forward-looking responsibility for ​v​. Likewise, in order for 
a​2 to assign ​a​1 responsibility for ​v​ or veto ​a​1’s taking responsibility for ​v​, ​a​1 must have a 
liability with respect to forward-looking responsibility for ​v​. In cases where ​a​2 lacks standing to 
assign forward-looking responsibility for ​v​ to ​a​1, we can say that ​a​1 has ​immunity ​with respect to 
that responsibility while ​a​2 has a disability.  
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In the next section, we show that responsibility-assigning and -repudiating nudges presuppose 
higher-order moral powers, liabilities, and immunities. While such powers and immunities are 
sometimes embodied, they are not always. In such cases, nudging is morally problematic.  
4. Nudge 
This supplementation of the Strawsonian framework offers a helpful way of understanding how 
nudges, though a recent development spurred on by advances in behavioral economics, jibe with 
established responsibility practices. So-called ​choice architects​ design and structure choice 
situations in ways that conduce to the performance of certain target actions (or omissions). These 
nudges work by exploiting widespread decisional heuristics and biases of which most of us are 
generally unaware (Thaler & Sunstein 2008). Although most of the discussion about nudges 
focuses on their use by allegedly well-meaning policy makers who are motivated to steer citizen 
behavior in ways that promote well-being, the use of such interventions is by no means restricted 
to benevolent government agents. By setting the default for participation in some scheme or plan 
as opt-out rather than opt-in, policy makers have increased organ-donation status and companies 
have increased participation in corporate pension schemes (Shepherd et al 2014 ; Beshears et al. 
2017). By diminishing the effort an agent has to make in order to secure some benefit or status, 
universities increased the likelihood that students of lower socioeconomic status would 
matriculate just by sending them application forms that were filled in with information from the 
family’s previous year’s tax returns (Castleman & Page 2016). A third kind of nudge involves 
the explicit or implicit communication of socially accepted norms. The Guatemalan government 
decreased rates of tax evasion by sending out letters that indicate that evasion rates are quite low 
(Kettle et al. 2016). These cases exemplify three nudge types, and it will suffice for our purposes 
to focus on them.  
 
The key question here is how the practice of nudging can be understood in light of the 
framework developed above. The relevant agents in this framework are policy makers and 
business managers, who are potential responsibility assignors, and citizens and employees, who 
are candidate responsibility assignees. The nudges that are implemented by the former groups 
target those in the latter groups and, if successful, result in the nudgee having taken 
responsibility for various distinct values. Regarding these values, there are three candidates that 
are the most relevant here. The first and perhaps most obvious is​ the value of whatever boost in 
well-being obtains as a result of the nudgee performing the target action​. This may be an 
increase in her own well being, as in the case of nudges that impact decisions that influence 
health or financial stability. If a1 successfully nudges a2 to save more for retirement, a2 will 
effectively be accepting responsibility for the value of being in a position to live comfortably in 
retirement. A second value is that of the nudged agent ​coming to meet her obligations​ (or 
forward-looking responsibilities) as a result of performing the nudged action. Sticking with the 
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savings nudge, a1’s nudge, if successful, induces a2 to perform an action that amounts to the 
meeting of a standing obligation to her future self and her family, and which is necessary for the 
performance of downstream actions that are also plausible moral obligations (such as making 
effective charitable donations or supporting friends in financial need). In this case the nudged 
agent accepts responsibility for the value of meeting obligations that she has. The third value is 
more normatively momentous. It involves a1 making it the case that the nudgee is in a position to 
realize a new value or meet some new obligation (or responsibility). When a nudge is successful 
at getting prospective students to matriculate to university, these nudged agents will incur all the 
new forward-looking responsibilities associated with being university students (such as not 
plagiarizing). Not only will these nudged agents be in a position to realize the particular values 
associated with being students, but  they will also have a new set of moral obligations. In a 
similar fashion, someone defaulted into a pension plan accepts new responsibilities -- those that 
come with managing and preserving one’s nest egg. 
 
There are thus three candidate values that nudged agents, as a result of being nudged, can accept 
responsibility for (some bearer of value, meeting one’s existing obligations, and meeting new 
obligations). Against this background we can see how the higher-order responsibility relations 
discussed in the previous section apply. When choice architects succeed, they are engaged in the 
practice of assigning responsibility, and so we can question whether they (should) have the 
power to do so and, correlatively, whether nudgees are relevantly liable to this assignment. 
Another relevant issue concerns accepting and repudiating responsibility. If the nudged agent 
accepts responsibility for the relevant values, then we can also say that she’s liable to the 
responsiblity assignment. Similarly, her repudiation of the responsibility assignment, if the 
nudger had the power to make the assignment in the first place, can only occur after the 
assignment has been made. Just to take one example, you might have been nudged via an 
enrollment default to have employer-subsidized health insurance, but later decide to cancel it as a 
money-saving measure. You thereby repudiate the forward-looking responsibility to maintain 
access to affordable health services. Finally, consider the issue of immunity and correlative 
disability. If there’s reason to think that agents are immune from being nudged into accepting 
responsibility for some value, then it follows that all possible nudgers have the disability to make 
the relevant responsibility assignment. This might occur if an accepted social norm entails that 
certain choice domains ought to be free of influence by government agents or employers. 
Presumably, our decisions about whom to vote for ought to be immune from influence by policy 
makers or political parties in power. Few people would accept a policy of having one’s ballot 
filled in with preferences for candidates that promise to support policies that promote one’s self 
interest. Plausible and widely accepted democratic principles disable governments from nudging 
votes in this way, even if the effect of voting defaults allow citizens to realize some political 
outcome that is valuable to them (or to satisfy their civic duty of supporting non-fascistic 
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candidates, for example). Another area in which we might think such immunity obtains is being 
nudged into marital relationships with particular partners. 
 
At this point one might wonder whether the mechanism by which nudges assign these 
responsibilities -- by capitalizing on (or exploiting) our cognitive and behavioral quirks, many of 
which we are unaware of -- raises worries about manipulation. The same considerations that 
justify immunity against voting nudges, namely that they manipulate agents to making decisions 
that they might not otherwise make in the absence of the nudges, might generalize. Why not also 
conclude that governments and companies that nudge us to making responsible choices are also 
manipulating us? If manipulation suffices for immunity in the one nudge, perhaps it should do so 
for all of them. One might think that nudgers are taking what Strawson (1962) called the 
objective attitude with respect to nudgees. Rather than viewing nudgees as equal participants in 
the moral community whose autonomy should be respected, the nudger sees them as objects to 
be controlled and manipulated. The question whether nudges are manipulative in a way that 
entails universal immunity is too broad for our purposes, but what we do in the final section is 
appeal to the framework developed in this chapter in order to highlight other features of 
particular nudges that might make them morally problematic. In so doing we show that our 
framework offers a novel way of mapping this normative terrain. 
5. When (not) to assign responsibility via nudging 
It is constructive to think about the ethics of nudges by viewing them through the lens of power 
relationships and the kind of moral principles that govern them. Of central relevance here are 
considerations that are typically taken to confer and legitimate the power of governments or 
private agents to assign responsibility to others. On the other side are considerations that support 
claims of immunity of individuals against such assignments. The permissibility of some nudge 
will depend in part on whether the balance of reasons supports the nudger’s power to assign 
responsibility or the claim that some agent has to immunity. A related factor is the nudged 
agent’s (and her community’s) acceptance or repudiation of the responsibilities assigned. In this 
final section we consider two distinct ways of grounding the claim that a nudge is problematic. 
5.1 No power to assign responsibility 
There are certain domains in which governments, companies, and institutions clearly have the 
power to assign responsibilities and other domains in which they clearly don’t. Policies that 
require parents to take responsibility for their children’s welfare will strike many as legitimate. 
No individuals are better-placed than parents to discharge this obligation, and it is a weighty 
obligation indeed. These facts plausibly confer power on the state to assign parents caregiving 
responsibilities. But are the nudges currently deployed by governments relevantly similar? There 
are at least two dissimilarities. First, the kinds of values at stake in the assignments of 
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responsibility involved in nudges are multifarious and don’t always involve getting an agent to 
meet her standing obligations. As discussed above, nudges that default into organ-donation 
schemes have a primarily axiological aim. Plausibly, the strength of whatever consideration 
underwrites the power to nudge will vary with the goal of the nudge. When the nudge would 
merely realize some good, the case for the state having the power to meddle in the lives of its 
citizens might be weaker than it would be if the nudge would realize the meeting of one’s 
obligations. That is, when it comes to power-conferral, axiological purposes are weaker than 
deontic. Furthermore, there might be room within these two types of purposes for further 
relevant distinctions. Regarding value, a nudge might target the general societal good or 
something good for the nudged agent herself, and regarding obligation, a nudge might enable an 
agent to meet an obligation that she has to herself or an obligation that she has regarding others. 
Table 3 represents a plausible rendering of how much these aims would support a nudger’s claim 
to the power to assign responsibility. 
 
Table 3: A rough rank ordering of the degree to which different types of nudges confer 
power on the nudger to assign responsibility. 
Nudge aim 
Degree of power-conferring 
support Example 
Realize value to society  Low Organ-donation defaults 
Realize value to the nudgee 
herself 
Low-moderate Pension-plan defaults 
Meet obligations to nudgee 
herself  
Moderate Easier-to-complete college 
applications  
Meet obligations to others High Information about neighbor’s 
energy consumption 
  
To be sure, this is just one way of characterizing the strength or power-conferring support that 
these nudges have. The norms accepted by a particular community concerning the importance of 
these generally-described aims may differ from this one. What this motivates is a demand that 
particular nudge proponents proffer reasons to accept their claim to have the power to assign 
responsibilities via their nudges. When the degree of power-conferring support is plausibly low, 
there’s a risk that the balance of reasons will not ground the power to nudge. 
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5.2 Immunity against responsibility-assignments 
Even when there is a high degree of power-conferring support for some nudge, perhaps because 
it enables a nudgee to meet many obligations, immunity may nevertheless obtain. As mentioned 
above, there are certain domains in which many communities are likely to accept norms that rule 
out paternalism of any kind. In addition to voting and marital decisions, one might think that 
paternalism, even the soft paternalism of nudges, should be forbidden in the context of healthcare 
decisions (White 2016).  A second way of being immune is repudiation by individuals or the 
community. This repudiation can be actual or hypothetical. For instance, In 2010 the Swiss 
municipality of St. Galen voted in a referendum to shift its energy production to greener sources; 
the local power utility then used default nudges to assign residents (in the first instance) to 
slightly more expensive but greener mixes of electricity sources. While citizens could choose to 
switch to cheaper, higher-polluting mixes (or an even greener mix), the default nudge had a large 
effect (Chassot et al. 2014). In voting to take responsibility for shifting their energy supply, the 
denizens of St. Galen conferred democratic legitimacy on this nudge, relinquishing any claim to 
immunity. We can easily imagine another municipality holding a similar referendum and 
choosing not to shift their energy mix. In such a case, it seems clear that nudging them to accept 
responsibility for paying for greener power would violate their immunity. 
5.3 Conclusion 
In this section we’ve shown that the framework of assigning responsibilities offers a novel 
orientation for thinking about the ethics of nudges and of other moral technologies. By shifting 
the focus to the power wielded by choice architects and the potential immunity of their targets, 
we can move beyond concerns about manipulation and autonomy. Nudges are just one way in 
which we engage in the practice of assigning, accepting, and repudiating responsibilities, and so 
the same normative frameworks that are appropriate to the latter should be brought to bear on the 
former. 
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